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Introduction
Korea’s currency crisis at the end of 1997 was caused by structural
weaknesses in the Korean economy. These vulnerabilities were brought
suddenly into the open by changes in both the domestic and inter-
national economic environments.
The direct trigger for the crisis, however, may be traced to problems
in maturity mismatches between foreign currency assets and liabilities,
which were further exacerbated when domestic financial institutions
borrowed excessively in the short term and invested long term in high-
risk assets. This implied major shortcomings in Korea’s management of
liquidity risk, including external debt, at a national level.
Following the currency crisis, Korea lifted most regulations it 
had placed on capital account transactions, while cross-border capital
movements became more active and fast-paced internationally. As 
this exposes Korea very acutely to changes in the international, as well
as domestic, financial market environment, the possibility of a sudden 
and rapid flow of short-term foreign capital is higher than ever before.
This being the case, the need to manage liquidity risk effectively at 
an integrated, national level, whereby public, financial and private sector
levels of foreign debt and liquidity are fully grasped and their monitoring
strengthened, has increased.
Foreign exchange liberalisation since the currency crisis
Since the 1980s, Korea has steadily eased regulations on capital account
transactions. However, it was not until the 1990s that full-blown capital
account liberalisation was pursued. Since then, with the currency crisis of
late 1997 serving as the turning point, the scope of liberalisation has been
widely expanded.
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It all started with Korea’s shift to a freely floating exchange rate
system in December 1997. Through the abolition of all restrictions on
foreign investments in domestic equities, short-term money market
instruments (May 1998) and domestic bonds (July 1998), the capital
markets were, in effect, fully opened.
The range of industries opened to foreign direct investment (FDI) has
also been continuously expanded, so that FDI is now allowed in almost
all industries except certain portions of the public sector. In May 1998,
foreigners were even allowed to engage in hostile takeovers of domestic
firms, and later, in November 1998, the Act on Foreign Direct Investment
and Foreign Capital Inducement was replaced by the Foreign Investment
Promotion Act. Furthermore, in June 1998 all qualifications for overseas
issuance of foreign currency securities and restrictions on the use of
their proceeds were eliminated. In July 1998, domestic corporations’
medium- to long-term foreign currency borrowings, as well as overseas
issuance of foreign currency securities, both of which had previously
been allowed only for maturities of three years or more, became
permissible for maturities of one year or more.
Meanwhile, realising that, in order for the Korean economy to make
another leap forward, the establishment of a new foreign exchange
system championing the principles of an open market economy was
necessary, the Korean government worked out, in June 1998, a plan for a
sweeping, two-stage liberalisation of all foreign exchange transactions.
With the implementation of the new Foreign Exchange Transactions Act
on 1 April 1999, the first stage of liberalisation took effect.
In this first phase, most foreign exchange transactions related to the
foreign operations of domestic corporations and financial institutions
were liberalised, marking the transition of the regulatory framework 
on capital account transactions from the previous “positive list system”
to the current “negative list system” where the permission of the
authorities is only required for a few categories of transactions. For
example, domestic firms’ short-term overseas borrowing and issues of
foreign currency securities,1 as well as non-residents’ issuance (domestic
and overseas) of won-denominated securities and the opening of 
1 Short-term foreign currency borrowing and overseas issues of foreign currency securities
are allowed only for firms whose financial position is judged to be sound, and whose credit
ratings from qualified credit ratings agencies are above investment grade.
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Policy responses to strengthen liquidity risk management
Enhancing the transparency of external debt statistics and improving external
debt management
Following domestic financial institutions’ poor management of their
external debt and liquidity towards the end of 1997, Korea has, since 
the currency crisis, started not only to monitor the external debt of 
the public sector and financial institutions, but also comprehensively
monitor the foreign debt of the private sector.
First, in order to dispel the scepticism in international financial circles
at the time of the currency crisis as to the amount of Korea’s external
debt, and as a means of enhancing the transparency of its external 
debt statistics, from December 1997, Korea started to compile and
disseminate its external debt statistics on a monthly basis, following 
a definition of “total external liabilities”3 agreed between the Korean
government and the IMF.
Then, in 1998, to enhance the accuracy and credibility of its external
debt statistics, the government and the Bank of Korea revised the 
manual for compiling such statistics. Furthermore, since the collection of
information on the foreign currency liquidity status of the overall
economy is instrumental for the efficient management of national
liquidity, the Bank of Korea conducted an extensive survey to gauge the
actual external debt of the public, financial and private sectors. Based on
this survey, a complete time series on total external assets and liabilities
was compiled.
Finally, in 1999, the Bank of Korea constructed a database containing
loan-by-loan information on long-term external debt, which it uses to
analyse repayment schedules and debt profiles. In addition, through semi-
annual surveys of the 150 or so domestic corporations which account
for 800/0 of total domestic corporate foreign currency liabilities and
assets, the Bank of Korea monitors the foreign currency liquidity status
of domestic corporations.
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Korean won deposit and trust accounts – all with maturities of one year
or more – were liberalised. In addition, the bona-fide demand principle,
which had been in place for derivatives transactions, was abolished, and
the derivatives transactions of foreign exchange business institutions
were fully liberalised.2 However, in order to block possible attacks on 
the Korean won by speculative funds, some capital transactions,
including non-residents’ deposits of Korean won for less than a year, and
derivatives transactions bypassing foreign exchange business institutions,
were not liberalised.
On the other hand, as a result of such extensive liberalisation of
foreign exchange transactions, the possibility of disruptions in domestic
financial and foreign exchange markets triggered by sudden and rapid
flows of capital has become increasingly high. This being the case, a 
legal framework, with safeguards which may be implemented in times 
of need within the boundaries set by international norms, has been
prepared.
For example, it is stipulated in the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act
that where there is concern over either (i) the balance of payments and
international financing becoming severely strained, or (ii) cross-border
capital movements hampering the conduct of macroeconomic policies,
certain measures may be taken. These include requiring permission for
foreign exchange transactions, a variable deposit requirement (which 
can require a proportion of non-FDI capital inflows to be placed in a
zero-interest account) and marginal reserve requirements. In principle,
however, safeguards are to be implemented on a selective basis, only
when deemed inevitable. Such measures may last for only up to six
months, and must be lifted as soon as their cause is no longer a threat.
Finally, in the second stage of liberalisation, scheduled to take effect
from early 2001, almost all foreign exchange transactions, excluding only
those transactions interrupting the maintenance of world peace and
social order, will be liberalised.
2 As a result of this measure, transactions in the domestic currency swap market and
won/dollar non-deliverable forward market have been promoted. However, the range and depth
of these markets are still quite insufficient, in comparison with those in developed economies.
3 Total external liabilities is the sum of external debt, as defined by the World Bank, and
domestic financial institutions’ offshore borrowing, as well as borrowing by domestic financial
institutions’ overseas branches and subsidiaries. This definition essentially covers all liabilities
ultimately repayable by Korea.
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$24 billion compared to the time of the crisis at end-1997. Total external
assets, on the other hand, reached $146 billion, an increase of $41 billion
over the same period. As a result, for the first time ever, Korea became
a net creditor (by $9 billion). The reasons behind such a decrease in 
total external debt, accompanied by an increase in total external claims
at the other end, may be summarised as: continued current account
surpluses in 1998 and 1999; consistent inflows of foreign investments;
and prepayment of the IMF’s Supplementary Reserve Facility loans and
financial institutions’ external debt.
A look at the debt profile also shows significant improvements,
particularly in the maturity structure. The percentage of short-term
external debt dropped from 400/0 (or US$ 64 billion) at end-1997 to
280/0 (or US$ 38 billion4) at end-1999. Moreover, scheduled amortisation
payments on long-term external debt are now appropriately dispersed.
Before the crisis, the short-term component of total external debt 
was excessively high, as domestic financial institutions depended heavily
on short-term borrowing to secure necessary foreign currency funds.
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By the end of 2000, in order to compile the statistics on external
assets and liabilities in a more timely and accurate manner, the Bank of
Korea plans to establish a computerised system, whereby data will 
be collected through the “Foreign Exchange Information Network” –
launched in April 1999 to link the computer networks of financial
institutions.
In addition, the Korean government is currently developing a
sovereign debt risk management system, with technical assistance from
the World Bank, to expand its sovereign debt management capacity.
Before the crisis, government debt did not exceed 100/0 of GDP.
Thereafter, however, following a significant increase in government
borrowing from multilateral institutions, such as the IBRD and the ADB,
as well as issues of government bonds to finance structural reform
programmes, government debt, is estimated to have increased to around
220/0 of GDP by end-1999. This, however, is a far cry from the OECD
average of about 700/0. Moreover, the government is on course to reduce
its debt and restore fiscal balance in 2004.
Table 1
Trends in government debt
At end-year
1996 1997 1998 1999
Government debt ($ bn) 43.6 46.8 76.0 84.4
Percentage to GDP 8.4 9.8 23.7 20.8
Note: Government debt is the sum of central government debt and IMF credit.
Table 2
Trends in total external assets and liabilities
In billions of US dollars (percentage of total)
Dec 1997 Dec 1998 Dec 1999
Total external liabilities 159 (100) 149 (100) 136 (100)
Long-term 96 (60) 118 (79) 98 (72)
Short-term 64 (40) 30 (21) 38 (28)
Total external assets 105 (100) 129 (100) 144 (100)
Long-term 32 (31) 30 (24) 25 (17)
Short-term 73 (69) 98 (76) 119 (83)
Net external liabilities           54 20 –9On the international scene, Korea’s ongoing efforts to improve 
its debt management practices have led to the strengthening of its
cooperation with multilateral institutions. Starting in 1998, Korea
resumed its Debtor Reporting System reports (of external public debt
and private debt publicly guaranteed) to the World Bank. Korea is also
actively following developments with regard to the introduction of an
external debt category in the IMF’s SDDS (Special Data Dissemination
Standard).
As a result of all its endeavours, Korea was able to reduce its 
total external liabilities to US$ 136 billion at end-1999, a decrease of 
However, in April 1998, the Korean government took measures to
reschedule the short-term foreign currency liabilities of domestic
financial institutions into medium- to long-term liabilities of one, two-
and three-year maturities. As a result, the ratio of short-term external
debt was significantly reduced.
4 Short-term external debt on a residual maturity basis is estimated as US$ 55 billion.
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• The maturity mismatch of foreign currency assets and liabilities is
further regulated through maturity gap ratios. For all foreign currency
assets and liabilities maturing within seven days, the sum of assets
must exceed that of liabilities. For those maturing within one month,
the amount by which the sum of liabilities exceeds assets must be
kept within 100/0 of total foreign currency assets.
• In addition, over 500/0 of the funding on foreign currency loans 
with maturities of three years or more is to be made with foreign
currency borrowings with redemption periods of three years or
more.
• The FSS also requires domestic financial institutions to establish and
apply in-house risk management guidelines. These categorise risks
associated with foreign exchange transactions by type, eg country
risk, large credit exposure risk, derivatives transactions risk, market
risk, etc. Their asset classification was modified so that future cash
flows are reflected (the so-called “forward looking criteria”). The
guidelines for accumulating loan loss provisions were also tightened
from the end of fiscal year 1999.
• The limits on domestic financial institutions’ foreign exchange
positions, relative to equity capital as of the end of the preceding
month, was raised from 150/0 to 200/0 in January 1999. The metho-
dology for computing positions was changed from net-aggregate
position to the standard recommended by the Basel Committee,
shorthand position. As a result, risks stemming from exchange rate
fluctuations are now more accurately reflected.
Building up foreign exchange reserves
Just before the outbreak of the currency crisis, at end-October 1997,
Korea’s usable foreign exchange reserves amounted to a modest 
US$ 22 billion. However, since November 1997, when the first symptoms
of an impending crisis began to emerge, Korea’s reserves had been
rapidly depleted to as low as $4 billion on 18 December 1997.
This was because the Bank of Korea provided from its reserves the
external settlement funds badly needed by domestic financial institutions,
which at the time were faced with insolvency following the withdrawal
of short-term foreign currency loans by foreign banks. Furthermore, in
order to offset the lack of liquidity in the foreign exchange markets, the
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Strengthening prudential regulations and supervision of financial institutions’
foreign currency operations
From the 1990s, Korean financial institutions hastily expanded their
operations related to foreign exchange and international finance during
the full-scale liberalisation and opening of Korea’s financial markets.
However, prudential regulatory schemes to keep up with such abrupt
developments were inadequate.
The criteria for classifying asset soundness, such as the BIS capital
adequacy ratio and loan classification criteria, were applied in quite a lax
manner in Korea, compared to the standards recognised in international
financial circles. Various prudential supervisory measures, such as a
liquidity ratio, risk management standards, restrictions on investments in
high-risk assets, etc, were not sufficient. In particular, with regard to
financial institutions’ foreign currency borrowing, regulations on the
inflows of short-term and long-term capital were asymmetrical. That is,
while long-term borrowing was regulated,5 no restrictions were placed
on short-term borrowing.
Under such circumstances, a considerable number of Korea’s financial
institutions exhibited business patterns centred around high-risk, high-
return assets, securing foreign currency funds through short-term
borrowing, while utilizing those same funds long-term. And when
currency crises struck the east Asian economies and domestic
corporations became insolvent, Korean financial institutions were
confronted with severe liquidity crises, witnessing a precipitous drop in
their short-term rollover ratios.
Accordingly, the Korean government has, since the currency crisis,
taken several measures to strengthen prudential supervision, including
measures to tighten financial institutions’ asset classification criteria.
Regulations on liquidity risk management, relating to the funding and
employment of foreign currency funds, have also been strengthened.
Maturity mismatches of foreign currency assets and liabilities are now
regulated by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) as follows:
• The ratio of foreign currency assets falling due within three months
to foreign currency liabilities maturing within three months must be
maintained at 800/0 or higher.
5 Domestic financial institutions had to report to the government their long-term foreign
currency borrowings exceeding US$ 10 million.
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Bank of Korea had to inject foreign currency into the markets, further
depleting its foreign reserves.
Consequently, as the build-up of external liquidity became pressing,
the Korean government turned first to the IMF for financial support,
and then borrowed further from the World Bank, the ADB and others.
By end-1999, a total of US$ 30 billion had been borrowed, of which 
$14 billion (IMF Supplementary Reserve Facility loans) had already been
repaid.
Korea’s foreign exchange reserves were further built up with issues
of Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund Bonds totalling $4 billion on 
8 April 1998.
Furthermore, as the current account continued to run a large surplus,
and foreign direct and portfolio investments had been flowing in
consistently since 1998, the Bank of Korea was able to call in its foreign
currency deposits at domestic financial institutions and appropriate them
to build up more reserves. As a result, usable foreign exchange reserves
increased dramatically, reaching US$ 74 billion6 at end-1999. This amount
is well above the traditional yardstick for determining the optimal level
of foreign exchange reserves – an amount large enough to cover current
account payments for three consecutive months. The current level of
reserves also exceeds short-term external debt, in terms of both original
(US$ 38 billion at end-1999) and residual (approximately $55 billion)
maturities.
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6 Of this amount, funds raised by borrowing from multilateral institutions or issuing Foreign
Exchange Stabilisation Fund Bonds total US$ 21 billion.
Table 4
Trends in the current account and foreign investments
In billions of US dollars
1997 1998
1999
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year
Current account surplus –8.2 40.6 6.2 6.4 6.7 5.7 25.0
Net FDI inflow 1.3 4.0 0.8 1.9 2.5 2.6 7.9
Net inflow of foreign 
portfolio investments1 1.9 5.2 2.9 4.5 –0.2 5.1 12.4
1 Funds invested in domestic equities, bonds, stock price index futures and options or short-
term money market instruments. Proceeds from the issues of overseas securities are also
included.
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Since the level of its foreign exchange reserves topped US$ 74 billion
at end-1999, the optimal level of reserves has been a matter of public
debate in Korea. The Bank of Korea has been experimenting with various
methods for calculating the optimal level of foreign exchange reserves.
One of these is an expanded definition of the Guidotti Rule.
It is important that adequate foreign exchange reserves are main-
tained, large enough to make provision against payments on possible
withdrawals of external liabilities and foreign investments in the short-
term, and to defend domestic foreign exchange market stability. Reserve
accumulation obviously incurs opportunity costs. However, the cost of
holding reserves should not be overstated. For it entails benefits that are
largely unquantifiable – reserves not only lower borrowing costs through
upgrading of the sovereign ratings but also help avoid potential crises.
In addition to the expansion of reserves, repo agreements were
signed with seven central banks, including those of China, Japan, Australia
and Singapore, as possible supplements to liquidity in times of crisis.
On the operational side, the Bank of Korea has established bench-
marks for reserve management, paying due regard to details including 
the currency composition and maturity profile of total external debt.
By doing so, the Bank of Korea is minimising risks associated with
exchange rate fluctuations, while at the same time preparing against
possible deterioration of the foreign exchange liquidity position of the
overall economy.
Strengthening the monitoring of cross-border capital movements
Having experienced the currency crisis, Korea recognised the urgency 
of establishing a system that would enable authorities to assess readily
day-to-day capital flows and follow international financial market devel-
opments, as well as maintain and use relevant data in an efficient manner.
Moreover, as a result of government measures to expand capital
account liberalisation following the currency crisis, the Korean economy
has become ever more exposed to changes in international financial
markets. Measures to expand capital account liberalisation have also
increased the possibility of domestic financial and foreign exchange
markets being disrupted by abrupt, cross-border movements of short-
term speculative funds. Hence, the need to strengthen the monitoring of
cross-border capital movements has become even greater.
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securing foreign exchange liquidity, and their heightened interest in risk
management.
At the other end, domestic financial institutions are developing
various schemes that would induce domestic firms to step up their
management of foreign exchange risks. One example is the recent move
by banks and merchant banking corporations to include domestic firms’
foreign currency risk management status as one of the items to be
evaluated during the loan screening process. Another is the inclusion 
of clauses in domestic firms’ loan agreements that would bind them 
to report periodically any derivatives transactions exceeding a specified
amount to creditor banks.
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In this context, together with the implementation of the first stage of
foreign exchange liberalisation in April 1999, the government and the
Bank of Korea set up the Foreign Exchange Information Network to
monitor constantly foreign exchange transactions. The government and
the Bank of Korea also founded the Korea Centre for International
Finance (KCIF), bringing together a group of specialists capable of reading
international financial markets and devising swift countermeasures.
Centred around the Bank of Korea, which serves as a foreign
exchange information concentration centre, the Foreign Exchange
Information Network links the computer systems of all foreign exchange
business institutions and users. It is a computerised network, capable of
timely collection and dissemination of information on foreign exchange
transactions to users. Through the use of this network, systematic
analysis of the trends in various foreign exchange transactions, including
short-term foreign funds and derivatives, as well as movements of
principal market indices, is made possible. In particular, monitoring is
centred on the trends in the flow of foreign portfolio investments,
investments in domestic securities, residents’ foreign currency deposits,
etc. The collected data are also shared with the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy, the FSS, the KCIF and others.
The KCIF, on the other hand, has the function of collecting and
analysing information on international financial market developments 
and reporting its findings to the government, the Bank of Korea and
other institutions on a regular and occasional basis. The KCIF is also
developing an early warning system with technical assistance from the
World Bank. This uses a stastical forecasting model to detect early signs
of a currency crisis.
Furthermore, the Bank of Korea has also established, within its
International Department, a specialised monitoring team exclusively
responsible for keeping a constant watch over the day-to-day situation in
the international and domestic financial markets.
Enhancing corporations’ capacity to manage foreign exchange risks
Following the currency crisis, transactions aimed at hedging against
exchange rate and interest rate risks through derivatives increased. This
was due to the increase in domestic corporations’ holdings of foreign
currency assets, including foreign currency deposits, for the purpose of
